Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Lonny S. v. Saul

United States District Court, D. Utah, Central Division

September 30, 2019

LONNY S., Plaintiff,
v.
ANDREW M. SAUL, [1] Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

          MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

          PAUL M. WARNER Chief United States Magistrate Judge.

         Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties consented to have Chief United States Magistrate Judge Paul M. Warner conduct all proceedings in this case, including trial, entry of final judgment, and all post-judgment proceedings.[2] Plaintiff Lonny S.’s (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his claims for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434, and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383f. After careful review of the administrative record, the parties’ briefs, and the relevant law, the court concludes that the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and, therefore, is AFFIRMED.

         BACKGROUND

         Plaintiff alleges disability due to various physical and mental impairments. In August 2014, respectively, Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI, alleging disability beginning in February 2014.[3] These claims were denied initially on December 31, 2014, and upon reconsideration on May 15, 2015.[4] Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a written request for a hearing.[5] Plaintiff appeared and testified at a hearing held on March 3, 2017, and again at a supplemental hearing on August 29, 2017.[6] On September 14, 2017, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) issued a written decision denying Plaintiff’s claims for DIB and SSI.[7] On August 1, 2018, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, [8] making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision for purposes of judicial review. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481.

         On September 28, 2018, Plaintiff filed his complaint in this case.[9] On November 27, 2018, the Commissioner filed an answer and a copy of the administrative record.[10] Plaintiff filed his opening brief on April 2, 2019.[11] The Commissioner filed an answer brief on April 29, 2019.[12] Plaintiff did not file a reply brief.

         STANDARD OF REVIEW

         This court “review[s] the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the correct legal standards were applied.” Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotations and citation omitted). The Commissioner’s findings, “if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It requires more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084 (quotations and citation omitted). “In reviewing the ALJ’s decision, [this court may] neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute [its] judgment for that of the [ALJ].” Madrid v. Barnhart, 447 F.3d 788, 790 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotations and citation omitted). “The failure to apply the correct legal standard or to provide this court with a sufficient basis to determine that appropriate legal principles have been followed [are] grounds for reversal.” Jensen v. Barnhart, 436 F.3d 1163, 1165 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotations and citation omitted).

         A five-step evaluation process has been established for determining whether a claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v); see also Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-51 (10th Cir. 1988) (discussing the five-step process). If a determination can be made at any one of the steps that a claimant is or is not disabled, the subsequent steps need not be analyzed. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).

Step one determines whether the claimant is presently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If [the claimant] is, disability benefits are denied. If [the claimant] is not, the decision maker must proceed to step two: determining whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments. . . . If the claimant is unable to show that his impairments would have more than a minimal effect on his ability to do basic work activities, he is not eligible for disability benefits. If, on the other hand, the claimant presents medical evidence and makes the de minimis showing of medical severity, the decision maker proceeds to step three.

Williams, 844 F.2d at 750-51 (quotations and citations omitted); see 20 C.F.R.§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(ii).

         “Step three determines whether the impairment is equivalent to one of a number of listed impairments that . . . are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity . . . . If the impairment is listed and thus conclusively presumed to be disabling, the claimant is entitled to benefits. If not, the evaluation proceeds to the fourth step . . . .” Williams, 844 F.2d at 751 (quotations and citations omitted); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii).

         At step four, the claimant must show that the impairment prevents performance of his “past relevant work.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). “If the claimant is able to perform his previous work, he is not disabled.” Williams, 844 F.2d at 751. If, however, the claimant is not able to perform his previous work, he “has met his burden of proof, establishing a prima facie case of disability.” Id.

         At this point, “[t]he evaluation process . . . proceeds to the fifth and final step.” Id. At this step, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner, and the decision maker must determine “whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity [(“RFC”)] . . . to perform other work in the national economy in view of his age, education, and work experience.” Id.; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If it is determined that the claimant “can make an adjustment to other work, ” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v), he is not disabled. If, on the other hand, it is determined that the claimant “cannot make an adjustment to other work, ” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v), he is disabled and entitled to benefits.

         ANALYSIS

         On appeal, Plaintiff contends that the Commissioner’s decision should be reversed because the ALJ: (1) failed to find Plaintiff’s posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) to be a medically determinable impairment, and (2) failed to accept Dr. Kendrick’s testimony regarding a possible need for work breaks, or alternatively failed to offer an explanation for not accepting this testimony. For the reasons that follow, the court finds Plaintiff has failed to provide the court grounds on which to overturn the decision of the Commissioner. ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.