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Fairchild v. Nelson

United States District Court, D. Utah

September 3, 2019

STEVEN MICHAEL FAIRCHILD, Petitioner,
v.
SHANE NELSON, Respondent.

          MEMORANDUM DECISION & ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS HABEAS-CORPUS PETITION

          DAVID NUFFER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         Petitioner, Steven Michael Fairchild, requests habeas-corpus relief from his Utah state convictions. See 28 U.S.C.S. § 2254 (2019). His convictions were affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals. State v. Fairchild, 2016 UT App 205, ¶ 1, cert. denied, 390 P.3d 724 (Utah 2017). Respondent moves for dismissal. (Doc. No. 17.)

         I. BACKGROUND

         The facts are drawn from the Utah Court of Appeals's opinion:

The State charged Defendant with one count of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony; four counts of possession of a firearm by a restricted person, a second degree felony; one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second degree felony; and four counts of receiving stolen property, a second degree felony. The State also sought to enhance Defendant's sentence by having him designated as a habitual violent offender. The parties agreed that the judge would determine whether Defendant was a habitual violent offender and that the remaining issues would be tried to a jury.
Before trial, the State moved to admit evidence, under rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, that Defendant was convicted of robbing two Logan banks in December 1998 and January 1999. The State argued that this evidence would show motive, plan, intent, and identity and that it was not attempting to impugn Defendant's character or establish his criminal propensity.
The court denied the State's motion and ordered that it not put on evidence of Defendant's prior crimes at trial. One day before trial, Defendant moved to sever the "restricted person" requirement from the rest of the restricted-person-in-possession-of-a-firearm charge. Instead, the parties stipulated that the "restricted person" requirement was satisfied. The court agreed, ordering that it would instruct the jury as to Defendant's restricted status but "would not allow any evidence regarding [Defendant's] previous convictions or the reasons why he is a restricted person."
Despite the 404(b) pretrial order and the stipulation, there were multiple references to Defendant's status as a parolee during trial. First, during the State's opening statement, the prosecutor told the jury that Parole Officer "was a supervisor over [Defendant's parole]," and Defendant's trial counsel did not object. Indeed, trial counsel characterized Parole Officer in much the same way during his own opening statement. Later, Parole Officer testified that he knew Defendant in his capacity as a parole officer, stating that "in June of 2011, [Defendant] paroled from prison to my caseload." But he did not say why Defendant previously had been imprisoned, and the prosecutor asked no follow-up questions. Defendant objected and moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the mistrial motion.
During closing arguments, Defendant's trial counsel and the prosecutor each referred to Defendant's status as a parolee. First, trial counsel said, "in the late fall of 2011, [Defendant] and [Girlfriend] went to the office of [Parole Officer]. They asked . . . permission to live together, to further their relationship. [He] granted their request." And the prosecutor repeated Parole Officer's name and title before stating, "He supervised the defendant."
When the court was preparing to instruct the jury that Defendant was a restricted person, the prosecutor suggested that the instruction include that Defendant was on parole at the time of the gas station robbery. The court refused, stating, "Well, I don't want to bring any more attention to that fact, frankly. I shouldn't have--well, parole, we're okay with that." The court ultimately issued a limiting instruction, informing the jury that Parole Officer only mentioned Defendant's parole to show that he
knows the defendant and is familiar with him. Do not use it for any other purpose. It is not evidence that the defendant is guilty of the crimes for which he is now on trial. . . . You may not convict a person simply because you believe he may have committed some other acts at another time.
The jury also heard testimony from Girlfriend, the two employees who were at the gas station during the robbery, and Employee. One of the employees testified that the robber had blue eyes, but Defendant has brown eyes. The State also presented the gas station's surveillance video, which showed the male suspect wore a dark hooded jacket, jeans, and white shoes. And it presented evidence of the items police found in Defendant's truck--the bandana, wallet, Camel cigarettes, psychedelic mushrooms, and guns.
The jury returned a guilty verdict on each of the ten counts against Defendant. The court then initiated a bench trial on the issue of whether Defendant was a habitual violent offender. It determined that he was. At sentencing, the trial court imposed indeterminate sentences of five years to life for aggravated robbery and each of the four weapons possession charges, one to fifteen years for the drug possession charge, and one to fifteen years for each theft by receiving stolen property charge. The court ordered that these sentences run consecutively to each other and to the sentence Defendant was already serving.
Defendant then filed a motion for new trial, arguing that the statements during trial that he was on parole violated the pretrial order and unfairly prejudiced him. The court denied Defendant's motion, ruling that Parole Officer's testimony did not violate the pretrial order and that, even if it did, the error was harmless both because the totality of the ...

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