United States District Court, D. Utah, Central Division
JANE DOE 1, JANE DOE 2, JANE DOE 3, JANE DOE 4, JOHN DOE 1, and JOHN DOE 2, Plaintiff,
RICHARD MILES and BRENDA MILES, Defendants.
N. Parrish District Judge
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO FOR
LEAVE TO TAKE EARLY DEPOSITIONS
C. Wells United States Magistrate Judge
matter was referred to the undersigned by District Judge Jill
N. Parrish pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ⸹
636(b)(1)(A). Pending before the court is
Plaintiffs' Alternative Motion for Leave to Take
Early Depositions (the motion). Having considered the
parties' memoranda and relevant standards, the court
finds the requested leave is not warranted. Accordingly, the
motion is DENIED.
action arises from allegations of abuse perpetrated through a
satanic, ritualistic sex ring in Bountiful, Utah in the
mid-1980s. In October 2018, Defendants filed a motion to
dismiss arguing the Plaintiffs' claims are statutorily
barred, and that subsequent amendments cannot retroactively
revive the claims. Currently the Utah Supreme Court is
reviewing the statute of limitations issue in Mitchell v.
Roberts, No. 20170447-SC (Utah S.Ct.). The dispositive
motion is pending before the district judge, not the
undersigned. In December 2018, Plaintiff filed the
“Alternative Motion for Leave to Take Early
Depositions, ” currently before this court.
to Rule 30(a)(2)(A)(iii), “A party must obtain leave of
court, and the court must grant leave to the extent
consistent with Rule 26(b)(1) and (2): (A) if the parties
have not stipulated to the deposition and: . . . (iii) the
party seeks to take the deposition before the time specified
in Rule 26(d)[.]” Rule 26(d) provides that “a party
may not seek discovery from any source before the parties
have conferred as required by Rule
26(f)[.]” Here, defendants responded to the
Plaintiff's Complaint with a Motion to
Dismiss. Thus, it appears the parties have not
conferred as per Rule 26(f) since no proposed Attorney
Planning Report and/or Scheduling Order appear on the record.
26(b)(1) and (2) provide the court broad discretion in
altering the standard sequence of discovery. However, the
party seeking expedited discovery in advance of a Rule 26(f)
conference bears the burden of showing good cause for
departing from the usual discovery procedures. Good cause exists
“where a party seeks a preliminary injunction ... or
where the moving party has asserted claims of infringement
and unfair competition.” Good good cause is also found
“where physical evidence may be consumed or destroyed
with the passage of time.”
these factors are at play here. Plaintiffs' only basis
for requesting expedited discovery is the allegation that
both Russell M. Nelson and Craig Smith “are of advanced
age.” Without offering any supporting evidence,
Plaintiffs offer the conclusory allegation that failure to
allow the expedited discovery will risk “irrepairable
prejudice by a delay.” Again, there is nothing on the
record to corroborate these claims. Conclusory allegations
are not enough to establish “good cause.” As
such, this court has no choice but to DENY Plaintiffs'
motion for leave to take early depositions.
reasons set forth above the Court DENIES Plaintiffs'
Short Form Discovery Motion [ECF No. 16].
 ECF No. 8.