United States District Court, D. Utah, Central Division
A. Kimball District Judge
M. WARNER CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Judge Dale A. Kimball referred this case to Chief Magistrate
Judge Paul M. Warner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(B). At the outset, the court notes that
Plaintiff Shorla Hunsaker (“Plaintiff”) is
proceeding pro se in this case. Consequently, the court will
construe her pleadings liberally. See, e.g.,
Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, 318 F.3d 1183, 1187
(10th Cir. 2003). The court also notes that Plaintiff has
been permitted to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 (“IFP Statute”). Before the court
is the review of Plaintiff's complaint under the
authority of the IFP Statute.
the court authorizes a party to proceed without payment of
fees under the IFP Statute, the court is required to
“dismiss the case at any time if the court determines
that . . . the action . . . fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). In determining whether a complaint fails
to state a claim for relief under the IFP Statute, the court
employs the same standard used for analyzing motions to
dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Kay v.
Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217-18 (10th Cir. 2007). Under
that standard, the court “look[s] for plausibility in
th[e] complaint.” Id. at 1218 (quotations and
citations omitted) (second alteration in original). More
specifically, the court “look[s] to the specific
allegations in the complaint to determine whether they
plausibly support a legal claim for relief. Rather than
adjudging whether a claim is ‘improbable,'
‘[f]actual allegations [in a complaint] must be enough
to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.'” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)) (other
quotations and citation omitted) (second and third
alterations in original).
undertaking that analysis, the court is mindful that
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and that “[a] pro se
litigant's pleadings are to be construed liberally and
held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d
1106, 1110 (10th C i r. 1991); see also, e.g.,
Ledbetter, 318 F.3d at 1187. At the same time,
however, it is not “the proper function of the district
court to assume the role of advocate for the pro se litigant,
” Bellmon, 935 F.2d at 1110, and the court
“will not supply additional facts, nor will [it]
construct a legal theory for [a pro se] plaintiff that
assumes facts that have not been pleaded.” Dunn v.
White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989) (per
[t]he broad reading of [a pro se] plaintiff's complaint
does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of alleging
sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be
based. . . . [C]onclusory allegations without supporting
factual averments are insufficient to state a claim on which
relief can be based. This is so because a pro se plaintiff
requires no special legal training to recount the facts
surrounding his alleged injury, and he must provide such
facts if the court is to determine whether he makes out a
claim on which relief can be granted. Moreover, in analyzing
the sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint, the court
need accept as true only the plaintiff's well-pleaded
factual contentions, not his conclusory allegations.
Bellmon, 935 F.2d at 1110 (citations omitted).
when the court liberally construes Plaintiff's complaint,
the court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to provide
enough well-pleaded factual allegations to support her
alleged claims for relief. Plaintiff provides only conclusory
allegations in her complaint and fails to provide any
sufficiently detailed factual allegations that would allow
the court to determine whether her claims should survive
those reasons, the court concludes that Plaintiff's
current complaint fails to state claims upon which relief can
be granted. At the same time, however, the court recognizes
that “[d]ismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to
state a claim is proper only where it is obvious that the
plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged and it
would be futile to give him an opportunity to amend.”
Kay, 500 F.3d at 1217 (quotations and citation
omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff is hereby provided with an
opportunity to amend her current complaint. Plaintiff shall
file an amended complaint that complies with the requirements
set forth in the above-referenced authorities on or before
November 26, 2018. Failure to do so will result in a
recommendation to Judge Kimball that this case be dismissed.
 See docket no. 4.
See docket no. 2.