United States District Court, D. Utah, Central Division
MEMORANDUM DECISION & ORDER GRANTING
RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
Waddoups, United States District Court Judge.
Cody J. Sabey attacks the execution of his state sentences.
28 U.S.C.S. § 2241 (2018). After burglary convictions,
he was sentenced to two five-years-to-life sentences and one
one-to-fifteen-years sentence. The Utah Board of Pardons and
Parole (BOP) later granted him parole, then revoked it and
decided that Petitioner would expire his sentence in prison.
specifically challenges the execution of his sentences as
“involuntary servitude, ” mistakenly asserting
that when BOP released him on parole it was taking his
indeterminate sentence and making it a determinate sentence.
He apparently believes that once he was released on parole
his sentences ended. He appears to view parole, its
revocation, and reinstatement of his imprisonment under his
original sentences as all beyond BOP's authority and as
violating the Federal Constitution.
that Petitioner has not stated a claim upon which relief may
be granted, Respondent moves for dismissal. The Court grants
are entitled to dismissal if “it appears beyond doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Maher
v. Durango Metals, Inc., 144 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir.
1998) (quotations and citations omitted). To survive a motion
to dismiss, the Petitioner must plead “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
GRANT DOES NOT END A SENTENCE NOR IS IT A SEPARATE
axiomatic that “[t]he essence of parole is release from
prison, before completion of the sentence, on condition that
the prisoner abide by certain rules during the balance of the
sentence. Parole is not freedom.” 59 Am. Jur. 2d Pardon
and Parole § 6 (1987). Indeed, “[t]he granting of
parole to a prisoner does not terminate the sentence that he
is serving. Rather, supervision in the prison setting is
replaced with supervision by probation authorities. The
confinement period and any subsequent period of parole
supervision are best understood as two parts of a single
indivisible sentence.” United States v.
Einspahr, 35 F.3d 505, 507 (10th Cir. 1994) (citations
and quotations omitted). A parole “[r]evocation
deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty to which
every citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional
liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole
restrictions.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 480 (1972).
short explanation of well-settled law defeats
Petitioner's argument, which really is so baseless as to
INDETERMINATE SENTENCING SCHEME
possibly also attacks the constitutionality of Utah's
indeterminate-sentencing scheme. He appears to assert that
Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme, under which the
trial judge imposes the sentence as a span of time, while the
BOP determines the exact time to be served within the span,
is unconstitutional. The same challenges were soundly
rejected by the Tenth Circuit. See Straley v. Utah Bd. of
Pardons, 582 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 130 S.Ct. 1737 (2010). Further, the Supreme
Court has specified that indeterminate sentencing schemes are
constitutional. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296,
308 (2004). The Court thus denies any relief on this possible
component of Petitioner's claims.
AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE ACTUAL TERM OF IMPRISONMENT WITHIN A
seems to challenge BOP's authority to determine his
actual term of imprisonment within his sentences of
one-to-fifteen years and five-years-to-life. Petitioner
possibly argues that BOP should not have been able to
"increase" his sentence. However, the sentence was
determined by the trial court at the time of conviction, not
during BOP's review of the term of service within the
sentence. BOP is never in a position to increase
Petitioner's term of service beyond his
trial-court-imposed sentences of one-to-fifteen years and
five-years-to-life and has proposed to do nothing more. So
BOP cannot possibly violate the Constitution here, no matter
how long it determines Petitioner should serve up to life in
prison. Under the Federal Constitution, Petitioner has no
right to ever be considered for parole or paroled and has no
right to be released before the end of his sentence--i.e.,
the end of his life. Greenholtz v. Inmates of
Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7
Court next addresses any of Petitioner's possible
assertion that Labrum was violated. See Labrum
v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902 (1993).
Labrum is Utah law and is neither controlling nor
persuasive in this federal case. It is well-settled that a
federal court may grant habeas relief only for violations of
the Constitution or laws of the United States. Estelle v.
McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991); Rose v.
Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). Errors of state law do
not constitute a basis for ...