United States District Court, D. Utah, Central Division
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
CAMPBELL U.S. District Court Judge
Mayall approached a doctor to cure his back pain. The doctor
treated Mr. Mayall in his clinic and, in fact, relieved his
pain. However, Mr. Mayall asserts that the clinic and the
hospital in which it was located, Cache Valley Speciality
Hospital, LLC (CVSH), failed to obtain preauthorization from
Mr. Mayall's insurance, creating a cascade of problems
with credit-reporting agencies and collectors. Along with the
doctor, the clinic, collectors, and various credit-reporting
agencies, Mr. Mayall sued CVSH, Mountain Division - CVH, LLC
(Mountain Division), and David Geary-CVSH's Chief
Financial Officer (collectively Hospital Defendants).
Plaintiff claims CVSH and Mountain Division violated the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), the Consumer Financial
Protection Act (CFPA), the Utah Consumer Sales Practice Act
(UCSPA), and committed fraud, negligent misrepresentation,
and civil conspiracy. Mr. Mayall asserts only the
civil-conspiracy claim against Mr. Geary.
Hospital Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings,
asking the court to dismiss all claims against them.
12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows parties
to “move for judgment on the pleadings” after
“the pleadings are closed-but early enough not to delay
trial.” “A motion for judgment on the pleadings
under Rule 12(c) is treated as a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6).” Atl. Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank
of Wichita, 226 F.3d 1138, 1160 (10th Cir. 2000). Under
that standard a complaint must contain enough factual
allegations, taken as true, “to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Hospital Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, asking the court to dismiss all the claims against
them. As a result, the court must analyze whether the claims
against the Hospital Defendants state “claim[s] to
relief that are plausible on their face.” Id.
Mr. Mayall's Third and Fifth Causes of Action Against
CVSH Fail as a Matter of Law.
Mayall asserted his third and fifth causes of action against
several parties, including CVSH. Those causes of action are
based on violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)
and the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA). The
Hospital Defendants contend that Mr. Mayall's third and
fifth causes of action fail as they relate to CVSH. First,
the Hospital Defendants argue that the FCRA does not allow
for private rights of action against furnishers of
information like CVSH. Second, the Hospital Defendants assert
that the CFPA does not allow for private rights of action in
“a federal statute has been violated and some person
harmed does not automatically give rise to a private cause of
action in favor of that person.” Cannon v. Univ. of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979). Instead, a court must
ask “whether Congress, expressly or by implication,
intended to create a private cause of action.”
Sonnenfeld v. City & Cty. of Denver, 100 F.3d 744,
747 (10th Cir. 1996).
FCRA “imposes a duty on persons who provide information
to credit reporting agencies (‘furnishers') to
accurately report information.” Sanders v. Mountain
Am. Fed. Credit Union, 689 F.3d 1138, 1147 (10th Cir.
2012) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)). While it also
“gives consumers a private right of action against
those who violate its provisions, . . . that right of action
is limited to claims against the credit reporting agency; it
does not extend to furnishers.” Id. (citing 15
U.S.C. § 1681s-2(c)). This is true even when the
violations are willful. Id.
CFPA, on the other hand, grants enforcement authority to the
Consumer Finance Protection Bureau (the Bureau) and to state
attorneys general. See 12 U.S.C. §§
5564(a), 5552(a). The CFPA contains no express authority for
private rights of action.
Mr. Mayall asserts that CVSH violated the FCRA and the CFPA
by reporting Mr. Mayall's “disputed debt to”
various credit agencies even after it knew that the
“disputed debt was not accurate.” (Am. Compl.
Second ¶¶ 103-05, ECF No. 80.) But FCRA does not
allow for private causes of action against furnishers of
information like CVSH. And because the CFPA grants
enforcement authority to the Bureau and to state attorneys
general, the court finds, as other courts have, that the CFPA
does not create any private rights of action. See e.g.
Gingras v. Rosette, 2016 WL 2932163, at *22 (D. Vt. May
18, 2016) (“Defendants are correct in their claim that
the [CFPA] . . . does not provide for a private cause of
action.”); Cornwall v. Centerstate Bank of Fla.,
N.A., 2016 WL 3219725, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 10, 2016)
(holding that the CFPA “does not authorize a private
cause of action”); Nguyen v. Ridgewood Sav. Bank,
Nos., 2015 WL 2354308, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2015)
(“Plaintiffs provide no statutory basis, and the Court
can find none, for finding a private right of action under
these provisions of the statute, which outlines duties,
authorities and enforcement powers of the CFPA.”).
Mr. Mayall's Sixth and Seventh Causes of Action Are
Mayall alleges in his sixth and seventh causes of action that
CVSH violated the Utah Consumer Sales Practice Act (UCSPA)
and committed fraud. The Hospital Defendants ...