Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals Third District, Salt
Lake The Honorable Judge Vernice S. Trease No. 031908633
D. Reyes, Att'y Gen., Tera J. Peterson, Asst. Att'y
Gen., Salt Lake City, for respondent.
M. Nelson, Salt Lake City, for petitioner.
Associate Chief Justice Lee authored the opinion of the
Court, in which Chief Justice Durrant, Justice Durham,
Justice Himonas, and Justice Pearce joined.
Associate Chief Justice.
In this case we are asked to interpret the terms of a
provision of the Crime Victims Restitution Act, Utah Code
section 77-38a-302(5)(b). That provision sets standards for the
calculation of "complete restitution." It states
that "[i]n determining the monetary sum and other
conditions for complete restitution, the court shall consider
all relevant facts, including" six enumerated categories
of economic loss. Utah Code § 77-38a-302(5)(b)(i)-(vi).
At issue here is one of the six enumerated categories -
subsection 302(5)(b)(iv), which states that "the court
shall consider . . . the income lost by the victim as a
result of the offense if the offense resulted in bodily
injury to a victim." Id. §
The question presented concerns the effect of the if
clause in this provision-whether it sets an exclusive limit
on the availability of restitution for lost income or states
only an exemplary factor of possible relevance to the
court's analysis. This distinction is a decisive one in
this case, which involves a claim for restitution by the
victim of a sex crime committed by Scott C. Wadsworth. The
State does not allege that the victim suffered bodily injury
as a result of Wadsworth's crimes. It alleges only that
Wadsworth's crimes led to the victim's depression,
which required counseling and impacted her ability to work.
The district court ordered Wadsworth to pay $12, 934 in lost
income in addition to restitution of the costs of the
Wadsworth challenged the lost income award on appeal,
asserting that lost income is not available under the Crime
Victims Restitution Act unless "the offense resulted in
bodily injury to a victim." Id. The court of
appeals affirmed. It observed that the statute directs the
court to consider "all relevant facts" in
determining complete restitution. State v.
Wadsworth, 2015 UT App 138, ¶ 21, 351 P.3d 826. And
it interpreted the enumerated categories in section 302(5)(b)
as merely exemplary and not exclusive, noting that they
identify only factors that are "includ[ed]" in the
"relevant facts" to be considered. Id.
(quoting Utah Code § 77-38a-302(5)(b)). Thus, the court
of appeals held that section 302(5)(b) contains "no
express language limiting the list of relevant facts a court
must consider when awarding restitution." Id.
¶ 21. And it accordingly affirmed the lost income award
entered by the district court against Mr. Wadsworth.
We reverse. We read the if clause of section
302(5)(b)(iv) as limiting. Thus, we hold that lost income is
available as a component of complete restitution only
"if the offense" in question "resulted in
bodily injury to a victim." Utah Code §
The if clause expresses a condition. It says that the
court may consider "the income lost by the victim as a
result of the offense if the offense resulted in
bodily injury." Id. (emphasis added). And the
bodily injury requirement holds as a condition only
if it is an exclusive criterion-the sine qua non of
a lost income award. We deem it as such.
The court of appeals' contrary conclusion robs the
statute's if clause of its plain meaning. If
lost income is available even absent evidence of bodily
injury, then it cannot be said that the court may consider
"the income lost by the victim as a result of the
offense" only "if the offense resulted in bodily
injury to the victim." Id. We reverse the court
of appeals on that basis. We hold that section 302(5)(b)(iv)
means what it says -"income lost by the victim" may
be considered only "if the offense resulted in bodily
This conclusion follows from the expressio unius
canon of construction-the presumption "that the
statutory expression of one term or limitation is understood
as an exclusion of others." Nevares v. M.L.S.,
2015 UT 34, ¶ 31, 345 P.3d 719. This presumption is
perhaps at its height in the context of an
"if-then" statement like the one at issue here.
This is an unequivocal statement of a condition. And the
condition would be eviscerated if we were to read the
expressed condition as exemplary and not exclusive.
The statute, as the court of appeals noted, directs the court
to "consider all relevant facts" in assessing
"complete restitution." Utah Code §
77-38a-302(5)(b). And it sets forth a list of considerations
that are "includ[ed]" among the "relevant
facts" that the court may take into account.
Id. With that in mind, we agree with the court of
appeals to some extent. Section 302(5)(b) does not state an
exclusive "list of relevant facts a court"
may "consider when awarding restitution."
Wadsworth, 2015 UT App 138, ¶ 21. The list is
undoubtedly exemplary -an indication of some of the
considerations that may be relevant to an assessment of
¶9 But that does not mean that the listed considerations
are without any limiting effect. In interpreting section
302(5)(b) we must consider all of the statute's terms.
And those terms include not only the "all relevant
facts" and "including" provisos, but also the
conditional statement that lost income is to be considered
"if the offense resulted in bodily injury to a
victim." Utah Code § 77-38a-302(5)(b)(iv). That
statement, as noted, is meaningless unless it limits the
consideration of lost income to a case in which "the
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim." So, to
give effect to that provision we must enforce that
limitation. And, to give effect to the ...