District Court, Ogden Department The Honorable Ernest W.
Jones No. 130906495
Bradford DeBry and Zachary E. Lambert, Attorneys for
Richard K. Glauser and David E. Brown, Attorneys for Appellee
Kate A. Toomey authored this Opinion, in which Judges Stephen
L. Roth and David N. Mortensen concurred.
This case involves an auto-pedestrian accident. Marjorie Ann
Brown appeals the district court's order granting summary
judgment in favor of the defendant, Lennie Williams. Brown
argues the court inappropriately applied workers'
compensation law in a negligence suit. She also argues
summary judgment should have been denied because there is a
genuine dispute as to a material fact. We affirm.
In January 2012, Brown was injured in an auto-pedestrian
accident while she was on her way to work for the Internal
Revenue Service in its Ogden, Utah office. The IRS building
site includes an employee-designated parking lot. For
security purposes, a fence surrounds both the building and
the parking lot. There is only one access point into the
facility, which is controlled by third-party security
personnel. To enter the facility, employees are required to
show their IRS employee badges.
On the morning of the accident, after passing through
security and parking her vehicle, Brown was walking through
the parking lot toward the building when she was struck by a
vehicle driven by Alice Nelson,  another IRS employee.
After her federal workers' compensation claim was denied,
 Brown filed a third-party negligence
suit against Williams. Williams moved for summary judgment,
arguing that because the accident occurred on IRS premises,
workers' compensation law precluded the negligence suit
under the exclusive remedy provision of the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act (the Act). Brown opposed summary judgment, arguing
the Act did not apply and that the accident did not occur on
IRS premises. Brown arrived at this conclusion because the
IRS does not own the building or parking lot, and a private
entity is responsible for the security of the premises. The
district court granted Williams's motion for summary
judgment, concluding Brown was entitled to workers'
compensation, because under recent case law, an
employer's parking lot is considered a part of its
premises; therefore, workers' compensation was
Brown's exclusive remedy. Accordingly, the court
dismissed Brown's claim with prejudice. Brown appeals.
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Brown raises two issues on appeal. First, she contends the
district court should have applied the "course of
employment" rules under tort law, rather than
workers' compensation law, to determine whether Brown and
Williams acted within the course of their employment at the
time of the accident. "Whether the district court
applied the correct legal standard is a question of law,
which we review for correctness." Bad Ass Coffee Co.
of Haw. v. Royal Aloha Int'l, LLC, 2015 UT App 303,
¶ 6, 365 P.3d 161.
Second, Brown contends summary judgment was inappropriate
because there is a genuine issue of material fact. Summary
judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) (2015). "In cases where the facts are in
dispute, summary judgment is only granted when, viewing the
facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary
judgment, the moving party is entitled to judgment."
Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1039
(Utah 1991). "The determination of whether ...