In the Matter of the Estate of Rufus C. Willey 
Shauna Child Schmunk, et al.,  Appellees. Don S. McBroom, Appellant,
District, Farmington The Honorable Thomas L. Kay No.
F. James, Mitchell A. Stephens, G. Stephen Long, Nicole A.
Westbrook, Salt Lake City, for appellant
L. Sullivan, Jared C. Fields, Salt Lake City, for appellees
Shauna Child Schmunk, Nancy Child Evensen, David Child,
William H. Child, Sheldon Child, Patricia Child, William
Steven Child, Susan Child Markham, Tamara Child Petersen,
Karen Child Ogden, and Michael Child
Stephen Marshall, Steven M. McCardell, Salt Lake City, for
appellee KeyBank, N.A.
Justice Himonas authored the opinion of the Court, in which
Chief Justice Durrant, Associate Chief Justice Lee, Justice
Pearce and Judge Mortensen joined.
been recused, Justice Durham does not participate; Court of
Appeals Judge David N. Mortensen sat.
1 Don McBroom, grandson of Rufus Call Willey, founder of the
R.C. Willey business enterprise, brought a motion under rule
60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure asking the Second
District Court to set aside two orders relating to Mr.
McBroom's interests in the business. The court denied the
motion, and this appeal followed.
2 We affirm. First, properly construed, Mr. McBroom's
rule 60(b) motion sought relief under paragraphs (3) and (4),
not (6).Second, since Mr. McBroom
filed his motion some forty years after the Second District
Court entered its orders, his claims under paragraph (b)(3)
are profoundly untimely. And third, Mr. McBroom's claims
under paragraph (b)(4) fail on their merits.
3 In McBroom v. Child, 2016 UT 38, __ P.3d__, we
discuss the relevant factual history regarding Mr.
McBroom's claims at length. In this opinion, we recite
only the relevant procedural history.
4 Mr. McBroom filed a petition on July 10, 2014, with the
Second District Court to review his "Rule 60(b) Motion
for Relief from Final Judgment and Motion for Relief Based on
Fraud on the Court, " which sought to set aside the
Second District Court's 1973 order (1973 Order) approving
a stock purchase agreement (1973 Agreement) and the Second
District Court's 1975 order (1975 Order) approving the
sale of Mr. McBroom's stock in R.C. Willey & Son.
Shortly thereafter, members of the Child family-many of whom
are relatives of Rufus Call Willey-filed a motion to
intervene in the proceedings under rule 24 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. And on September 22, 2014, KeyBank filed
a motion, which the district court granted, asking the court
to "authorize its [c]lerk to acknowledge KeyBank as a
party and to accept filings by KeyBank in this matter."
In its final order, dated August 26, 2015, the district court
granted the Child family's motion to intervene in part,
denied Mr. McBroom's rule 60(b) motion, and denied Mr.
McBroom's motion for relief based on fraud on the
court. We have jurisdiction over Mr.
McBroom's appeal of this decision under Utah Code section
5 "[A] district court has broad discretion in ruling on
a motion to set aside an order or judgment under rule 60(b),
and '[t]hus, we review a district court's denial of a
60(b) motion under an abuse of discretion
standard.'" Metro. Water Dist. of Salt Lake
& Sandy v. Sorf, 2013 UT 27, ¶ 12, 304 P.3d 824
(second alteration in original) (citation omitted).
6 The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Mr. McBroom's rule 60(b) motion. We first classify Mr.
McBroom's claims for relief under the proper paragraphs
of rule 60. We conclude that Mr. McBroom did not properly
file a claim for relief under paragraph (b)(6), and instead
his claims fall under paragraphs (b)(3) and (4). Next we
conclude that because Mr. McBroom did not file his motion
under paragraph (b)(3) within ninety days, as prescribed by
rule 60(c), his claims based on allegations of fraud on the
court are untimely and we do not consider them. We then
proceed to analyze Mr. McBroom's claims under paragraph
(b)(4). And we hold that all of his paragraph (b)(4) claims
are meritless. As a result, we affirm the district
court's denial of Mr. McBroom's rule 60(b) motion.
PROPER CLASSIFICATION OF MR. MCBROOM'S RULE 60(b) MOTION
7 Rule 60(b) allows a court, "upon just terms, " to
"relieve a party or its legal representative from a
judgment, order, or proceeding" for reasons laid out in
paragraphs (b)(1) through (6). The rule further provides that "[a]
motion under paragraph (b) must be filed within a reasonable
time." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(c). Moreover, a motion under
paragraph (b)(1), (2), or (3) cannot be filed more than
ninety days after entry of the judgment or order.
Id. Because of these differing times, we must
determine under what paragraphs Mr. McBroom's reasons for
relief fall. Mr. McBroom claims to have filed for relief
under paragraphs (b)(4) and (6). We conclude, however, that
Mr. McBroom did not appropriately file for relief under
paragraph (b)(6), and instead his claims fall under
paragraphs (b)(3) and (4).
8 In his filings with the Second District Court, Mr. McBroom
claimed to seek relief under paragraphs (b)(4) and (6). Mr.
McBroom made several arguments claiming that the orders from
which he is seeking relief are void. By the plain language of
rule 60, a party seeking relief from a judgment or order on
the basis that "the judgment is void" must press
his or her claim under paragraph (b)(4). Utah R. Civ. P.
60(b)(4). The only other basis upon which Mr. McBroom sought
relief was fraud on the court. But Mr. McBroom cannot seek
relief under rule 60(b)(6) based on an allegation of fraud on
the court. Instead, a motion seeking relief from a judgment
based upon an allegation of fraud on the court necessarily
falls under paragraph (b)(3), not paragraph (b)(6).
9 Under the plain language of rule 60, a party seeking to be
relieved from a judgment or order based upon an allegation of
fraud on the court must do so under paragraph (b)(3). Utah R.
Civ. P. 60(b) (permitting a court to relieve a party from a
judgment when there is "fraud . . ., misrepresentation
or other misconduct of an opposing party"). Motions
under paragraph (b)(6), on the other hand, must be based on a
reason other than those listed in paragraphs (b)(1) through
(5). Id. (permitting a court to relieve a party from
a judgment for "any other reason that justifies
relief"); see also Richins v. Delbert Chipman &
Sons Co., 817 P.2d 382, 387 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
("Relief under [paragraph (b)(6)] embodies three
requirements: 'First[, ] that the reason be one
other than those listed in subdivisions (1) through
[(5)] . . . .'"(citation omitted)). Rule 60(b)(6) is
a residuary clause; a party may not rely upon it if the
asserted grounds for relief fall within any other paragraph
of rule 60(b). See Laub v. S. Cent. Utah Tel.
Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1304, 1306-07 (Utah 1982). As a
result, because Mr. McBroom sought relief from the Second
District Court's orders based on an allegation of fraud
on the court, his motion squarely falls under paragraph
(b)(3), not paragraph (b)(6).
10 Therefore, having properly classified Mr. McBroom's
rule 60(b) motion into the proper paragraphs, (b)(3) and (4),
we proceed to determine if Mr. McBroom timely filed his
motion, and if so, whether the merits of his arguments