The opinion of the court was delivered by: Tena Campbell, United States District Judge
Plaintiff Living Rivers, Inc. ("Living Rivers"), a non-profit, incorporated environmental group, claims that Defendant the United States Bureau of Reclamation (the "BOR") violated the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") by refusing to disclose documents that Living Rivers requested under FOIA. The documents are inundation maps prepared by the BOR for the areas below Hoover Dam and Glen Canyon Dam. The BOR contends that disclosure of the maps could endanger the dams and those who live downstream from the dams, and therefore are exempt from disclosure under FOIA. The matter is before the court on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons set for below, the court GRANTS BOR's motion and denies Living Rivers' motion.
On September 19, 2001, Living Rivers requested pursuant to FOIA that the BOR disclose all inundation maps, including those pertaining to dam failure, for the areas below Hoover Dam and Glen Canyon Dam. On November 9 and November 19, 2001, the BOR denied the requests on the ground that the maps were exempt from disclosure under FOIA's Exemption 2. The BOR explained that the inundation maps related to the BOR's internal practices and that disclosure of the maps would risk circumvention of a statute or regulation. Living Rivers appealed the decisions administratively on December 10, 2001. On April 2, 2002, the United States Department of the Interior—of which the BOR is a part—denied the appeal. On July 3, 2002, Living Rivers filed this lawsuit.
In support of their motion, the BOR submitted the Declaration of Larry L. Todd. (Todd Decl., Ex. 3, attached to BOR's Mem. in Support of Def. BOR's Cross Mot. for Summ. J. and in Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J.)*fn1 Mr. Todd has been the Director of Security, Safety and Law Enforcement of the BOR since June 30, 2002. This position was created after September 11, 2001. Before September 11, security, safety and law enforcement matters were handled by the Director of Operations. Mr. Todd held that position until his present position was created.
Mr. Todd explained that the BOR created the maps
to allow evaluation of the effects of dam failure, to
protect the public downstream of the dam from the
consequences of dam failure, and to assist federal and
local law enforcement and emergency officials by
providing timely and concise emergency information in
the event of dam failure. In addition, the inundation
maps are a key element in allowing the BOR to
determine the risks at various dams and to set
priorities in addressing issues of dam safety.
(Todd. Decl. ¶ 10)
Mr. Todd described the information shown in the inundation maps:
Inundation maps show which downstream areas and
communities would be flooded and are at risk in the
event of a dam failure. The maps reveal populated
areas, communities and recreational areas that would
be at risk due to dam failure. The maps also show
critical infrastructure, such as power plant sites,
that would be affected by the failure. The maps show
estimated travel times for the flood progression at
key locations, which are usually communities or
populated areas. Most of the maps also show estimated
flow volumes and water depths at these key locations.
(Id. ¶ 12)
According to Mr. Todd, "[t]he inundation maps include information that is unique and not otherwise readily ascertainable by the public." (Id. ¶ 21). Therefore, "[t]he precise nature of flood damage that would result from a failure of the dams, as depicted in the inundation maps, is not known by the general public." (Id.)
Mr. Todd explained that, in his opinion,
[t]he information shown on the inundation maps would
comprise dam security and the security of the
surrounding populations if the maps fell into the
hands of a terrorist or other person intending to harm
one or more of the Colorado River dams (collectively,
"terrorist"). The inundation maps would give the
terrorist information about the amount of damage that
could be caused by destroying a dam. Because the
inundation maps are based upon a worst-case scenario,
they present a broad view of the extent of damage
resulting from breaching the dam, thus making the dam
a more attractive target to the terrorist.
In addition to identifying the populations that
would be affected by the destruction of a dam, the
inundation maps could be used to identify critical
infrastructures, buildings, and facilities which would
be destroyed by attacking the dam. This information
too is valuable to terrorists.
Because the inundation maps show flood travel times
and water depths, terrorists could use the inundation
maps to help plan and execute sequenced attacks, which
could include attacks on bridges and roads to cut off
evacuation routes or attacks on communications
facilities to disrupt emergency response.
(Id. ¶¶ 16-18.)
Mr. Todd described the measures that the BOR takes to ensure the security of the inundation maps. These include keeping the maps in locked areas and limiting the distribution of the maps to those who "demonstrate a `need to know' [including State and Federal law enforcement and emergency officials] in ...